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 Problems and Recommendations 
Moving Targets: 
Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy 
Objectives for the Post-2020 Period and Implications 
for the German Energy Transition 
Since 2007, energy and climate policy has occupied 
a prominent place on the agenda of the European 
Union (EU). The so-called “20-20-20 targets” negotiated 
during the German Council Presidency were the first 
step towards an integrated policy approach aimed at 
making the energy supply not only more competitive 
and secure but also more ecologically sustainable. 
Because of the long investment cycles in the energy 
industry and the time needed for the EU to reach 
agreement on its position in the international climate 
negotiations, debate on the policy framework for the 
period beyond 2020 has already begun. In March 2013, 
the Commission presented a Green Paper launching 
the formal consultation process. In January 2014, it 
developed its ideas further, proposing targets of a 40 
percent reduction in emissions and a 27 percent share 
of renewable energy by 2030. However, any decision 
on a new EU energy and climate strategy ultimately 
lies with the European Council, in which the 28 heads 
of state and government have to reach consensus. 
This study considers the plausible and probable 
outcomes of negotiations to establish a new EU energy 
and climate policy framework for the post-2020 peri-
od. In addition, it explores how the likely scenario 
of an unambitious EU compromise would affect Ger-
many’s “Energiewende” (energy transition) policy. 
If one compares the present situation with that 
before 2007, a shift in priorities becomes evident. 
Since the onset of the global economic crisis, energy 
price trends have substantially increased in im-
portance. Negative experiences in past United Nations 
(UN) climate negotiations have led to disagreements 
within the EU over whether unilateral commitments 
should be made prior to an international agreement. 
Not only do many Member States now question wheth-
er the set of EU targets in place up to 2020 – reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions, expanded use of renewable 
energy, and increased energy efficiency – should be 
maintained in the years to come; some also appear 
to be falling short of their original levels of ambition. 
Already it seems likely that the project of long-term 
transformation to a low-carbon economy will face 
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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
major difficulties when it comes to practical imple-
mentation. 
To date, however, this paradigm shift has received 
relatively little attention in the energy and climate 
policy debate. The central arguments used to justify 
the EU policy framework and the pace of its continued 
development are not based on apparent changes in 
Member State preferences, but mainly on optimized 
macroeconomic policy designs. Such models, which 
are founded on an ideal of consistent rationality, 
propose long-term transformation pathways for the 
European energy system, yet overlook the enormous 
influence of changing political rationalities in the EU. 
Transformation concepts with firm targets and time-
tables require a consistent long-term policy design, 
which is far from what exists in reality. As a result, an 
energy and climate discourse that is based primarily 
on macroeconomic models often leads to political 
misperceptions. The outcomes of complex intergov-
ernmental negotiation processes often take the expert 
community by surprise, since second-, third-, and 
fourth-best policy scenarios are seldom explored and 
played out in any detail. 
This investigation deliberately takes a different 
tack. We analyze the decision-making process primari-
ly from the negotiators’ perspective. In the course of 
our examination, we not only weigh the different fac-
tors that influence Member States’ preferences but 
also consider procedural aspects of the negotiation 
process that have been largely overlooked in the 
energy and climate debate to date. This enables us to 
probe the range of potential negotiation outcomes in 
greater depth. Not least, this approach significantly 
increases the capacity of all actors and stakeholders 
to anticipate potential developments well in advance. 
Since the negotiations between Member States are 
still at an early stage and will probably only be 
concluded after the 2015 UN Climate Conference in 
Paris, it is impossible to predict concrete outcomes of 
the process with any degree of certainty. Only a lim-
ited number of Member States have already expressed 
clear preferences; many are taking a “wait-and-see” 
approach. The proposals put forward by the Commis-
sion in January 2014 did little to change this. The 
European Parliament will only come into play when 
the heads of state and government have agreed on 
overarching targets, which will then make it necessary 
to adapt policy instruments such as emissions trading 
in the context of concrete legislative processes. From a 
German perspective, it is crucial to seriously examine 
the framework architecture, levels of ambition, and 
time horizon of the EU’s key energy and climate policy 
targets and to explore how these would fit into the 
national energy transition project. 
The task of this study is not only to outline the 
main elements of conceivable compromises in the 
negotiations, but also to analyze how these elements 
can be linked and worked out in detail. At present, 
it appears likely that the 28 heads of state and govern-
ment will only be able to agree on a moderate emis-
sions reduction target. Moreover, they will probably 
be unable to reach consensus on a renewable energy 
target applying to the entire energy sector. Such an 
outcome would have a much greater impact on the 
German “Energiewende” than observers in Germany 
currently believe: a comprehensive European climate 
policy and increasing integration of European elec-
tricity and gas markets would make it very difficult 
for Germany to decouple itself from undesirable devel-
opments at the EU level. Not only could this create 
pressure on Germany to modify its own renewable 
energy targets: If the EU reduces its climate protection 
ambitions and if it keeps the price of emission allow-
ances low, this would also make it difficult if not im-
possible to achieve the emissions reduction targets set 
as part of Germany’s energy transition. 
If the German federal government intends to con-
front this challenge effectively, it will have to step 
up its efforts at the EU level. These will only bear fruit, 
however, if it first develops a strategy for designing 
the European dimension of Germany’s “Energie-
wende” policy. In light of the complex constellation 
of factors in EU negotiations and the continued broad 
base of support for energy transition policy in Ger-
many, a relatively pragmatic approach should be 
taken. At the center of this approach should be the 
effort to design European policies that preferably 
reinforce and support, but at least do not interfere 
with the German “Energiewende,” in order to ensure 
that Germany’s flagship project will not be under-
mined by developments at the EU level. This would 
imply that in EU negotiations, the German govern-
ment should focus on negotiating an agreement that 
includes both an ambitious emissions reduction target 
as well as a legally binding renewables target for the 
electricity sector. 
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 Structure of the negotiation and decision-making process 
 
As an economic and political union of 28 Member 
States based on a common legal system, the EU is char-
acterized more than almost any other international 
organization by complex institutional structures and 
decision-making processes that are regulated by inter-
national treaties. In order to identify the most plau-
sible and probable outcomes of the negotiations on 
a new energy and climate policy for the period after 
2020, it is necessary to first examine a few procedural 
issues, the explicit and implicit rules of the nego-
tiation and decision-making process, and the path 
dependencies that characterize this policy field. 
Whereas the EU treaties define the legislative pro-
cess in the Union, they are less specific in setting out 
the procedures for strategic policy decisions. These 
fundamental decisions are always made by the Euro-
pean Council. Largely independent of the Commis-
sion’s preparatory work, the European Council, com-
prised of the 28 heads of state and government of the 
EU’s Member States, determines both the content and 
point in time of its own decisions, which are always 
taken by consensus.1 In the subsequent ordinary legis-
lative procedure, the European Commission has the 
right to initiate legislation. It presents specific pro-
posals to the Council of the European Union, which is 
composed of 28 national ministers specialized in the 
particular policy area in question, and to the Europe-
an Parliament. They vote on the proposals according 
to different majority voting rules that depend on the 
subject of the respective proposal until agreement is 
reached on new directives, regulations, or decisions. 
This two-part EU policy-making process, divided into a 
process of intergovernmental strategy decision, followed 
by community-method legislative procedures, has been 
1  Article 15 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) reads: 
“The European Council shall provide the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development and shall define the 
general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not 
exercise legislative functions.” Paragraph 4 explains further: 
“Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of 
the European Council shall be taken by consensus.” This 
wording enables decisions to be made when members of the 
European Council are absent or abstain from voting despite 
the unanimity requirement; see also Article 235 (1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
standard practice in a range of EU policy fields for 
years. It will also be used in designing the new energy 
and climate policy framework for the period after 
2020.2 
The EU Commission has been doing substantial 
preparatory work for the approaching post-2020 nego-
tiations since 2011. The Member States, in contrast, 
were long hesitant to take any position, sometimes 
creating the impression among members of the 
energy and climate policy community that the Com-
mission was the driving force in the process. The 
Commission launched the debate in 2011 with the 
successive proposal of three roadmap papers based 
on macroeconomic modeling for the period up to 
2050.3 In the first of these, an overarching roadmap 
for moving to a low-carbon economy, the Commission 
explored how ambitious emissions reductions targets 
up to 2050 could be implemented in the energy and 
particularly in the transport sector and what inter-
mediate targets could realistically be set for 2030 and 
2040. The subsequent inability of the different Council 
formations to agree even on legally non-binding targets 
for the individual roadmaps was mainly attributed 
to the dissenting position of the Polish government, 
whose veto prevented the Council from adopting any 
conclusions.4 The Commission’s next move was some-
what more cautious. In March 2013, it published a 
Green Paper on Energy and Climate Policy up to 2030 
that was more closely oriented toward Member States’ 
2  It is important to note that the European Council defines 
and determines the strategy but is not responsible for its 
implementation. As Peter Ludlow aptly observed with regard 
to the March 2007 Summit, where an integrated energy 
and climate policy was first agreed upon, “A good European 
Council generates work. A poor one induces lethargy.” Peter 
Ludlow, “A View on Brussels: A Tale of Two Councils,” Euro-
comment Briefing Note 5 (March 2007) 1/2: 3. 
3  European Commission, Roadmap for moving to a competitive 
low-carbon economy in 2050, COM(2011) 112 (Brussels, 8 March 
2011); idem, Energy Roadmap 2050, COM(2011) 885 (Brussels, 
15 December 2011); idem, White Paper. Roadmap to a Single Euro-
pean Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient 
transport system, COM(2011) 144 (Brussels, 28 March 2011). 
4  See also Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden, The EU’s Energy 
Roadmap 2050: Targets without Governance, SWP Comments 
8/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 
2012). 
SWP Berlin 
Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives 
March 2014 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
Structure of the negotiation and decision-making process 
preferences, although still using the analysis under-
lying the roadmaps.5 The two Directorates-General of 
the Commission that were responsible for this subject 
(DG Energy and DG Climate Action) finally drafted a 
concrete proposal for a policy framework after 2020 
based on their own evaluation of stakeholder posi-
tions on the Green Paper and supplemented by a com-
prehensive macroeconomic impact assessment. 
The Commission’s proposal, published on January 
22, 2014, refers to a domestic greenhouse gas reduc-
tion target of 40 percent and a renewable energy 
target of 27 percent, both for the year 2030. Even more 
interestingly, the Commission suggested establishing 
a new governance structure for the renewables target, 
based on national energy plans that would be evalu-
ated by the Commission. At the same time, the target 
would only be legally binding on the EU level, con-
taining no national targets and thus leaving more 
flexibility for the Member States.6 
Although the January 2014 proposal serves as an 
initial reference point for the debate, the procedure 
initiated with the Commission’s communication is a 
purely intergovernmental process.7 The Member State 
governments alone will decide when a decision will 
be made and what questions and policy issues it will 
address. The negotiations will take place largely out-
side public sphere within the working groups of the 
Council and in the Member States’ Permanent Repre-
sentatives Committee (Coreper). Points of disagreement 
that cannot be resolved on this level are presented 
for further discussion at the Council meetings of the 
energy and environmental ministers. Each of these 
two Council configurations adopts conclusions by 
consensus, but the two are usually not compelled to 
come to an agreement between themselves.8 Because 
of the relative independence of the two configurations 
in this process, it is possible that the Environment 
Council would endorse more ambitious objectives at 
this stage than the Transport, Telecommunications, 
5  European Commission, Green Paper. A 2030 Framework for 
Climate and Energy Policies, COM(2013) 169 (Brussels, 27 March 
2013). 
6  European Commission, A policy framework for climate and 
energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, COM(2014) 15 (Brussels, 
22 January 2014). 
7  The Commission does not play a role in negotiations from 
this point in time onward, but because of its competencies 
for EU competition law, it is in a position to place indirect 
pressure on the governments of the Member States. 
8  In addition, other Council configurations can take posi-
tions on a Commission proposal – for example, the EU Com-
petitiveness Council. 
and Energy Council. Coreper has the task of resolving 
any differences between the two sets of conclusions, 
preparing the meetings of the European Council, and 
formulating draft Council conclusions. The final deci-
sion on the energy and climate policy framework for 
the post-2020 period will ultimately be made by the 
28 heads of state and government in the European 
Council. 
The form and scope of this decision is not defined 
in advance. The policy framework agreed upon in this 
process will consist mainly of general statements 
about EU strategic priorities and precisely quantified 
objectives (“headline targets”) that are given particular 
prominence – for example, targets for reducing emis-
sions, expanding the share of renewable energies, and 
increasing energy efficiency. This framework may also 
be accompanied by an “action plan” addressing issues 
that cannot be translated into quantified headline 
targets, such as the EU’s external energy policy or the 
development of the internal energy market. In any 
case, the strategic decision is subject to the unanimity 
rule, which gives even small states like Malta and 
Cyprus the power to block a resolution with their veto. 
When it comes to asserting positions, however, Mem-
ber States’ sizes and alliances play a significant role.9 
Only when this phase of broader strategy develop-
ment has been concluded can the Commission begin 
the procedure of drafting detailed legislative pro-
posals. First, the 28 heads of state and government 
in the European Council reach a general decision; 
then the European Parliament and the configuration 
of the Council of Ministers responsible for the respec-
tive policy area work out the details in the ordinary 
legislative procedure. At this point, deviations from 
strategic decisions are possible, but only to a very 
limited degree.10 Since there is little scope for inter-
9  The importance of alliances and specific groupings of 
Member States has increased. At the same time, alliances 
have become more differentiated in terms of the issues 
around which they coalesce; see The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union, ed. Erik Jones, Anand Menon, and Stephen 
Weatherill (Oxford, 2012), in particular Part IV, “Member 
States (Cleavages),” 249–320. 
10  This statement can be justified alone by the role of the 
European Council as “the EU’s Ultimate Political Authority” 
(Jeffrey Lewis, “Council of Ministers and European Council,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, ed. Jones et al. 
[see note 9], 327). The fact that slight modifications are entire-
ly possible can be seen, for example, in how the objective 
adopted by the European Council in 2007 of increasing the 
share of biofuels in the transport sector to 10 percent by 2020 
has been dealt with. Because of the increasingly negative 
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Structure of the negotiation and decision-making process 
pretation in the case of quantified headline targets11 
and since these have tended to define the course of 
energy and climate policy communication in the EU 
up to now, the headline targets are currently at the 
heart of the decision facing the European Council. 
When the European Council produces very detailed 
conclusions, this leaves less room to maneuver for the 
actors in the subsequent legislative procedures. Con-
versely, “non-decision” by the Council on a particular 
issue or intentionally vague targets may be under-
stood as a means of shifting the respective issue into 
the subsequent policy arena, with its own constella-
tions of actors and decision-making rules.12 
 
 
reporting on biofuels and in light of the increasing potential 
of electric-powered vehicles, a decision was made in 2009 in 
the process of enacting the Renewable Energy Directive to 
redefine the target as a 10 percent share of renewable ener-
gies in the transport sector. 
11  A percentage value for a headline target – for example, 
“40 percent emissions reductions by 2030” – usually cannot 
be changed after the fact. More precise regulations can be 
formulated, however, to change the originally intended 
(or merely stated) level of ambition. 
12  See also George Tsebelis, “Bridging Qualified Majority and 
Unanimity Decisionmaking in the European Union,” Journal 
of European Public Policy 20, no. 8 (2013): 1083–1103. Tsebelis 
argues that the choice of unspecific formulations during the 
decision-making process can increase the likelihood of an un-
animous decision. 
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 How Member State preferences emerge 
 
An analysis of the negotiations over future policy frame-
works must consider not only the procedural aspects 
of the EU decision-making process, but also the pref-
erences of the key actors: EU Member State govern-
ments. Their preferences are affected not only by fun-
damental national interests and perceptions of energy, 
climate, and economic policy issues, but also by a 
crucial question underlying all Member State deci-
sions on European policy issues: What political prob-
lems need to be addressed on the EU level in the first 
place? An additional factor that may substantially 
influence Member State government behavior in the 
post-2020 negotiations is each state’s specific past 
experience with an integrated European energy and 
climate policy. 
The EU energy strategy adopted in 2007 must there-
fore serve as the starting point for our analysis.13 The 
headline targets established in this strategy – reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent compared to 
1990 levels, increasing the share of renewable energy 
sources in final energy consumption to 20 percent, 
and moving towards a 20 percent increase in energy 
efficiency – have largely defined the discourse to the 
present day. This is not only a result of the catchy 
“20-20-20” formula but also a reflection of the high 
status accorded to these targets in Europe 2020, the 
EU’s economic growth strategy.14 But what the 2007 
resolutions accomplished first and foremost was to 
create procedural and political path dependencies 
that will continue to affect the course of negotiations 
over the post-2020 policy framework in the years to 
come.15 
13  Council of the European Union, European Council Brussels, 
8/9 March 2007. Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 
(Brussels, 2 March 2007), doc. 7224/1/07 REV 1: 10–23. 
14  There, meeting the climate change and energy objectives 
stated in the 20-20-20 formula is listed as one of five EU head-
line targets in the new European strategy for jobs and growth; 
see European Council, Conclusions of the European Council of 
17 June 2010 (Brussels, 17 June 2010), doc. EUCO 13/10, 11f. 
15  These path dependencies are not as strong as was the case, 
for example, in negotiations on the EU budget; see also the 
instructive analysis by Peter Becker, Lost in Stagnation. The EU’s 
Next Multiannual Financial Framework (2014–2020) and the Power 
of the Status Quo, SWP Research Paper 14/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2012). 
A changing context 
Three developments that took place in the run-up to 
the European Council Summit of March 2007 had a 
decisive influence on Member States’ perceptions of 
the problems discussed at that time. The first of these, 
which had a profound impact, was the increased 
media attention to the threat of climate change. This 
period of mounting public opinion reached its apex 
with the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in 2007. The year before, the Stern Review com-
missioned by the British government had already spot-
lighted the economic dimension of climate change 
and made a significant contribution to shifting the 
issue of climate change into the mainstream of EU 
policy debate. Perceptions of the problems were also 
influenced, second, by concerns of new Member States 
in Central and Eastern Europe about the security of 
their oil and gas supply, particularly in relation to 
Russia. Third, price developments on the international 
energy markets created pressure for action. Although 
the Member States differed considerably in their inter-
pretations of these problems, they could all find their 
individual perspectives reflected in the conclusions of 
the European Council, which were formulated in cor-
respondingly broad terms. The new approach of an 
“integrated EU energy and climate policy” was intend-
ed both to address the supply security needs of the 
Central and Eastern European countries and to satisfy 
the more sustainability-oriented countries of the EU-
15. But while the Energy Action Plan only contained 
very general statements about creating a common 
external energy policy and finalizing the internal 
energy market, it elevated the targets of reducing 
emissions, expanding renewable energies, and saving 
energy to the status of (to some extent legally binding) 
overarching objectives. As a result, the EU energy 
policy was clearly dominated by the paradigm of sus-
tainability in the period following 2007.16 
16  See Oliver Geden and Severin Fischer, Die Energie- und 
Klimapolitik der Europäischen Union. Bestandsaufnahme und Per-
spektiven (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 13ff; Severin Fischer, 
Auf dem Weg zur gemeinsamen Energiepolitik. Strategien, Instru-
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A changing context 
Only a few years have passed since the EU heads 
of state and government first decided to develop an 
integrated energy and climate policy and to set a few 
symbolically important medium-term targets for this 
project. The consensus formula on which they agreed 
– that European policy should strive to ensure a sus-
tainable, competitive, and secure energy supply – is 
still in use up to the present, although its impact on 
everyday practice is negligible. The debate on a new 
policy framework still revolves around the three estab-
lished headline targets, and thus above all around the 
question of whether the EU should set new targets for 
reducing emissions, expanding renewable energies, 
and increasing energy efficiency by 2030 – and if so, 
at what level. 
The way the debate has unfolded in the EU is not 
merely the result of political and administrative path 
dependencies, which will be discussed in more detail 
below. It can also be explained by the conceptual 
framework in which EU energy policy is embedded. 
Since 2007, energy policy has been seen as the key 
component in a comprehensive, sustainability-ori-
ented project of economic transformation that will 
ultimately lead to a European low-carbon economy. 
All of the relevant decisions of the European Council 
express the (legally non-binding) aspiration to achieve 
a 80 to 95 percent reduction in greenhouse gases by 
2050, a target range that has been described since the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a fair contribution 
on the part of developed countries to achieving the 
2°C target. The roadmaps for climate, energy, and 
transport proposed by the EU for the period up to 
2050 are all based on similar ideas, but make a further 
assumption that is not in line with the European 
Council conclusions so far: that the EU should aspire 
to emissions reductions of at least 80 percent in any 
case, no matter how other developed countries choose 
to behave.17 For a transformation project that spans 
such a long period of time and defines the specific 
amount of emissions reductions so far in advance, it 
appears advisable to flesh out key details early, and 
in ten-year stages – not just as a series of isolated deci-
sions but within a coherent policy framework. 
In the last few years, only Poland has aggressively 
criticized this approach, most notably when it blocked 
Council conclusions on the Commission’s 2050 road-
mente und Politikgestaltung in der Europäischen Union (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2011), 88ff. 
17  Fischer and Geden, Energy Roadmap 2050 (see note 4). 
maps. But not even Poland questions the necessity of 
a European and global emissions reduction policy. 
Nor does it disagree with the prime importance of the 
energy sector in such a policy.18 The Polish criticism – 
which many other Central and Eastern European 
Member States now share – is directed at the level of 
unilateral emissions reduction efforts by the EU and 
the planned speed of transformation to a low-carbon 
economy. On these points, Poland has advocated that 
the economic situation of individual Member States 
should be taken more strongly into consideration. 
The Visegrád Group, consisting of Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, place high priority 
on topics such as energy prices and the use of domes-
tic fossil fuel sources. Yet this has not led them to call 
for supplementary headline targets in the areas of 
competitiveness or supply security19 – even though 
both of these aspects moved to a much more promi-
nent position on the official EU agenda following the 
extraordinary European Council meeting of May 
2013.20 Instead, the Visegrád Group’s efforts have been 
aimed at weakening the paradigm of an ecologically 
sustainable transformation. 
From a conceptual point of view, the Central 
and Eastern European Member States have confined 
themselves to proposing additional conditions for 
the implementation of the European transformation 
model. In political practice, however, this has led 
them to be cautious in all decisions on medium-term 
18  Energy-related emissions are responsible for approximate-
ly 80 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. The 
Commission proposes in its roadmaps that the energy sec-
tor’s emissions be reduced by an above-average 85 percent by 
2050, and electricity sector emissions by as much as approxi-
mately 95 percent. 
19  Many of the targets proposed in the discussion so far are 
quantifiable (e.g., state of completion on cross-border infra-
structure projects, energy price differences from other devel-
oped and developing countries, or the level of import depend-
ency). However, they are not suited to becoming legally bind-
ing targets, but at most indicative targets, since they are 
difficult if not impossible to translate into instruments that 
could be used to precisely regulate European energy markets. 
Even if the targets were merely indicative, the Commission 
would not be able to escape proposing legal acts for their im-
plementation, which would result in extremely wide-ranging 
state interventions into energy markets. Even if that were 
possible in conformity with European law, the resulting regu-
lations would scarcely be capable of gaining majority support 
in the Council and Parliament. 
20  European Council, Conclusions – 22 May 2013 (Brussels, 
23 May 2013), doc. EUCO 75/1/13 REV 1, 1–5; see also Peter 
Ludlow, “Energy and Taxation – The European Council of 
22 May,” Eurocomment Preliminary Observation 3/2013. 
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EU targets. These states have received tacit support 
from the crisis-hit countries of southern Europe, 
whose political interests at the moment are focused 
more on economic recovery than on ecological trans-
formation. Sooner or later, this will have an impact 
on the EU’s transformation concept. The EU’s aim 
of rapid and efficient decarbonization expressed in 
the “80 to 95 percent by 2050” formula can only be 
achieved if the energy and climate policy framework 
up to 2030 fulfills criteria of minimal coherence. This 
would include at least a relatively ambitious emission 
reduction target. 
Path dependencies and past experiences 
with EU instruments 
The question of what conclusions the Member States 
are drawing from their previous experiences with an 
integrated energy and climate policy is closely linked 
to that of how the other EU partners perceive and 
evaluate the implementation of the three headline 
targets first adopted in 2007.21 In contrast to the peri-
od of debate leading up to the 2007 decision, when 
Member States had little experience in these areas, 
now they have practical insights from actually work-
ing with the targets and instruments, and these 
experiences are influencing their preferences signifi-
cantly. 
Emissions reductions 
Because production levels have declined since the 
beginning of the economic crisis in the EU, the goal of 
a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020 (compared to 1990) has come within reach much 
more quickly than was expected in 2007. At the end of 
2012, emissions had already been reduced by 18 per-
cent. There is little doubt that the EU will maintain 
an emissions reduction target after 2020. But there is 
likely to be significant controversy over how high that 
target should be. In particular, Member States may 
21  See Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden, Updating the EU’s 
Energy and Climate Policy: New Targets for the Post-2020 Period 
(Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, May 2013), 3ff. For com-
prehensive monitoring of the individual Member States’ 
progress toward the 2020 targets, see European Environment 
Agency, Trends and Projections in Europe 2013. Tracking Progress 
towards Europe’s Climate and Energy Targets until 2020 (Copen-
hagen: EEA, 2013). 
have negative associations with a conditional 
approach making the EU’s emissions reduction com-
mitment dependent on the measures other developed 
and developing countries agree to undertake. The 
attempts during 2010 and 2011 to change the EU’s 
target to 30 percent without an international agree-
ment, which were spearheaded by several Nordic and 
Western European Member States led by the UK, 
ended in failure. They were blocked by Poland with 
the tacit support of many other Central and Eastern 
European Member States. The fact that the EU has 
been unable to raise its emissions reduction target 
for 2020 even though it has already nearly reached 
the current target shows that, due to the unanimity 
requirement, targets set by the European Council are 
very difficult to adjust at a later stage – even in cases 
where the situation has changed dramatically. 
A similar problem is evident in the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS), which was long considered 
the crowning achievement of EU climate policy and 
which, since 2013, has been a fully Europeanized 
instrument that covers around half of all European 
greenhouse gas emissions.22 The over-allocation of 
emissions allowances, partly due to the recession, and 
the resulting decline in the price of emissions certifi-
cates has almost completely undermined any govern-
ance effect of the ETS. A profound structural reform 
cannot be expected in the current third trading period 
(2013–2020) due to strong opposition in the Council of 
Ministers.23 Many of the Member States that are more 
ambitious on climate policy issues believe that early 
agreement on a rigorous emissions reduction target 
for 2030 could have a stabilizing effect on prices. 
Although the less ambitious Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states are skeptical about raising the level of 
ambitions significantly, they still consider emissions 
trading to be an efficient regulatory instrument that 
should be kept in place in the future. 
22  Up to 2020, emissions reductions in sectors not included 
in the ETS (e.g., road transport, agriculture, buildings, ser-
vices) will be subject to diverse national targets that take into 
account the different economic capabilities of the Member 
States. 
23  Therefore, the long-awaited Commission proposal for 
structural ETS reform aims to establish a market stability 
reserve only at the beginning of the fourth trading period in 
2021, see: European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment 
and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse 
gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, 
COM(2014) 20 (Brussels, 22 January 2014). 
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Path dependencies and past experiences with EU instruments 
Renewable energy 
In contrast to the widely harmonized emission reduc-
tion policies, most measures to support the use of 
renewable energy sources are still being developed at 
the national level. While the EU has set an overall 
target of increasing the share of renewable energies in 
gross final energy consumption by 20 percent, this EU 
average target for 2020 is divided into widely varying 
national targets that range from 10 percent (Malta) to 
49 percent (Sweden).24 Aside from the Member State 
obligation to inform the Commission regularly about 
national policies to support the achievement of the 
respective national target, there is no genuinely Euro-
pean instrument currently being used to promote the 
use of renewable energy. In contrast to the Emissions 
Trading Directive, which contains regulations even 
for the post-2020 period in the version that has been 
in place since 2009, expressing the EU’s intention 
to treat climate protection as a long-term task, the 
Renewable Energy Directive only contains targets 
reaching up to 2020. The question of whether there 
should be a binding target for the use of energy from 
renewable sources after 2020 remains completely 
open. For many Member States, past experiences with 
policies designed to expand the use of renewables up 
to 2020 play a key role in their current positions on 
this question. Although the Commission’s last progress 
report concludes that the 20 percent target could be 
achieved by simply maintaining the growth rates of 
the past few years,25 national trajectories are drifting 
apart. While Germany, Austria, and the Scandinavian 
and Baltic Member States will, in all likelihood, achieve 
their national targets, a number of other Member 
States will have great difficulties in doing so. Through-
out much of Southern and Central-Eastern Europe, 
the support systems that used to exist either have 
been severely cut back due to shifting domestic policy 
priorities or have fallen victim to consolidation pres-
sures in the wake of the economic and financial crisis. 
If Member States in these regions should show that 
they are falling short of their national targets in the 
years to come, potentially triggering formal infringe-
ment proceedings, there will be even less incentive to 
24  The target for Germany is 18 percent and therefore below 
the average. 
25  European Commission, Renewable energy progress report, 
COM(2013) 175 (Brussels, 27 March 2013). As of 2011, the 
share of renewable energy in final energy consumption 
was 13 percent. 
agree on a binding renewable energy target for the 
period after 2020. 
Energy efficiency 
From the outset, the weakest of the three headline 
targets formulated in March 2007 was the energy 
efficiency target. In contrast to the other two 20 per-
cent targets, the goal of a 20 percent improvement 
in energy efficiency by 2020 was not regarded as a 
legally binding objective by the European Council, 
but merely as an indicative target. This also meant a 
significant lack of clarity in what the target actually 
implied, because increased energy efficiency was 
defined as relative energy savings. What the heads of 
state and government agreed on in 2007 was a 20 
percent reduction in estimated energy consumption by 
2020 – although it took the Commission until 2010 to 
specify what estimates this decision should be based 
on. Although EU energy consumption is showing 
a slight downward trend, this is mainly due to the 
recession and only in small part to efficiency im-
provements. The 20 percent target will probably not 
be reached by 2020. In recent years, most Member 
States, with the exception of Denmark, have shown 
very little interest in efficiency improvements or 
energy saving measures that are binding under Euro-
pean law – as evidenced in the lengthy negotiations 
over a revised Energy Efficiency Directive. The desire 
of Member States for a new headline target at the EU 
level is also limited, especially since this would trigger 
increased regulatory activity on the part of the Com-
mission, even if the target were once again solely 
indicative. Although it would be easier for the Central 
and Eastern European Member States to achieve 
energy efficiency improvements compared with the 
technologically more advanced Nordic and Western 
European countries, this does not mean that they 
want this kind of headline target on the EU level. A 
definition of efficiency that requires a reduction in 
absolute energy consumption is now widely consid-
ered to be growth inhibiting. While all this does not 
mean that energy efficiency will not have a place in 
future EU energy policy, most Member States do share 
an interest in maintaining the greatest possible degree 
of flexibility for independent action in this area. 
How the Member State governments evaluate the 
successes and failures in implementing the energy 
strategy of 2007 will play an important role in the 
post-2020 negotiations. This background of experience 
SWP Berlin 
Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives 
March 2014 
 
 
 
13 
 
How Member State preferences emerge 
significantly distinguishes the recently initiated 
process from its predecessor, which led to the deci-
sions of the European Council in March 2007. Today, 
the Member States have much more than a theoretical 
conception of what role quantified headline targets 
play in the everyday functioning of an integrated EU 
energy and climate policy and how rather vaguely 
worded objectives actually function in practice. The 
“completion of the internal energy market,” for in-
stance, is periodically announced by the European 
Council to take place in a certain year (most recently 
2014), but such a complex and unspecific target can-
not, from a regulatory standpoint, be implemented 
with just a handful of measures. Even more important 
are the learning processes that Member States have 
gone through in using the EU energy and climate 
policy instruments. These include the effects of emis-
sions trading on the electricity market, commitments 
to expanding the use of renewable energy sources that 
emerge from the Renewable Energy Directive, and the 
demands for implementation that the Commission 
itself has derived from a strictly indicative EU energy 
efficiency target. 
While the Central and Eastern European states 
were still relatively inexperienced in dealing with EU 
instruments and their consequences in 2007, when 
the targets for 2020 were negotiated, they are now 
articulating their interests and positions much more 
clearly and precisely – particularly since most of these 
governments have developed their own national 
energy strategies in the meantime. Today, if these 
Member States make proposals at the EU level at all, 
their aim is to ensure the compatibility of EU plans 
with their own national plans – rather than the other 
way around. Likewise, these states are less interested 
in impact assessments that apply to Europe as a 
whole. Instead, they usually call for detailed national 
impact assessments. The danger this raises for the 
negotiations on post-2020 targets is that the process 
could become overburdened with purely national 
issues that could delay the decision-making process, 
making it difficult for the European Council to reach 
consensus. 
 
 
SWP Berlin 
Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives 
March 2014 
 
 
 
14 
 Key elements of a negotiation compromise 
 
If we look at the process of creating an EU policy 
framework for the post-2020 period from a Member 
State perspective, the negotiators will have their eye 
on three main dimensions.26 The discussion will focus 
on the basic target architecture, that is, on the question 
of what sort of quantified objectives the EU still wants 
to set. No less important will be the specific design of 
the headline targets, for example, the level of ambitions 
and the internal structure of the selected targets. The 
time horizon could also become an important subject 
of negotiations, although the year 2030 appears so far 
to be uncontroversial. What the central elements of 
a compromise will ultimately look like depends not 
least on the basic structure of the negotiation outcome, that 
is, on the question of whether the European Council 
will be able to agree once again on a comprehensive 
package or if the 28 heads of state and government 
will choose instead to make a series of individual deci-
sions (see figure, p. 16). 
The most important context factor that will affect 
the process of intra-European decision making is the 
roadmap for UN climate negotiations. The decisive 
date here is the climate summit set to take place in 
Paris in late 2015 – the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At that summit, accord-
ing to the schedule of negotiations agreed upon in 
Durban in 2011, a comprehensive global climate treaty 
is to be reached among all of the developed and devel-
oping countries whose level of ambitions corresponds 
to the already internationally agreed 2°C target. Since 
the EU does not regard its emissions reduction policy 
as an end in itself but rather as a means of addressing 
a global problem – and since not all Member States 
support the strategy of Europe playing a leadership 
role in international environmental policy – the 
Europeans will first have to decide how EU decisions 
should relate to the UN process. Should unilateral 
European reduction obligations be set before COP 21 
to create a positive impetus for international nego-
tiations? Or should Europeans wait and see what the 
26  These dimensions should be understood primarily as 
analytical categories. In the negotiations, these are not 
treated as separate and neatly delineated areas. 
outcomes of COP 21 are, and until then only formu-
late conditional targets that would only become 
binding if all major emitters actually sign an am-
bitious UN agreement? Or would it be better to com-
bine the two approaches again, as was done in 2007, 
two years before the failed COP 15 in Copenhagen? 
The longer it takes for the European Council to 
come to a decision, the less ambitious the European 
emissions reduction target will probably turn out to 
be. Many Member States would stress that increasing 
the level of ambitions significantly within a very short 
period of time is not economically viable. After the 
disappointing outcome of the UN climate conference 
in Warsaw (COP 19), the 2015 Paris summit cannot 
be expected to produce an agreement that could be 
described as a success by the criteria formulated in 
Durban in 2011. This has already become evident 
in how the EU Member States are trying to manage 
expectations for Paris. The states that normally want 
to go slow on climate policy, rather than the more 
ambitious states, are now the ones emphasizing the 
importance of a comprehensive and ambitious UN 
Climate Agreement. While this may at first seem para-
doxical, the underlying thinking is that if the out-
comes of Paris 2015 are considered a failure by the 
European public, this will increase support through-
out Europe for the Visegrád Group’s view that the EU 
should curb its leadership ambitions for economic 
reasons. 
Target architecture 
Up to now, the target architectures discussed by the 
Member States have been derived almost exclusively 
from the pool of “headline targets” that has existed 
up to now. 
By far the broadest consensus exists around extend-
ing the current emissions reduction target. In the case 
of the renewable energy target, aside from a few pro-
ponents and a significant number of indifferent Mem-
ber States, there are also a fairly considerable number 
of outright opponents. Among the three targets, sup-
port for a new energy efficiency target is undoubtedly
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Outline 
Key elements of a negotiation compromise 
Target architecture Option 1 
Emissions reduction 
(“technology-neutral  
climate target”) 
Option 2 
Emissions reduction  
+ expansion of renewable energy  
(“two-target model”) 
Option 3 
Emissions reduction  
+ expansion of renewable energy  
+ increase in efficiency 
(“three-target model”) 
Design of the 
“headline targets” 
 Specific target level for 
emissions reduction 
 “Domestic” or with 
offsets? 
 Unilateral and/or 
conditional? 
 Distribution over ETS 
and non-ETS sectors 
All elements of Option 1  
plus 
 Specific target level for 
expansion of renewable 
energy 
 National targets or 
EU-wide target? 
 Share of renewables in 
total energy consumption 
or individual target for 
the electricity sector? 
All elements of Options 1+2  
plus 
 Specific target level for 
increasing efficiency 
 Reduction in energy con-
sumption or improvement 
in energy intensity? 
 Legally binding or indica-
tive? 
Time horizon 2025 or 2030? 
Basic structure of the 
negotiation outcome 
Comprehensive package or series of individual decisions? 
 
 
the weakest.27 From a present-day perspective, the 
debate on the energy and climate policy framework in 
the EU up to 2030 is likely to center on the following 
three target architecture options. 
Option 1: A single “technology-neutral” 
emissions reduction target 
Of the Member States that took a position in the 
debate on post-2020 targets early on, a group initially 
led by the UK and Poland28 has argued in favor of a 
single headline target limiting greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Citing the idea of “technology neutrality,” a 
central concept of this approach, its proponents argue 
that the EU should maintain its goal of reducing emis-
sions. At the same time, however, they believe that 
27  Our analysis is based not only on official position papers 
but also on unofficial documents and discussions with repre-
sentatives of various Member States, individual stakeholders, 
as well as the Commission. 
28  This group now also includes Romania, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary, and with some qualifications 
Finland, Lithuania, and Spain. In March 2014, the UK changed 
its original position and declared that it can support an EU-
level renewables target, as long as it does not contain binding 
national targets. 
an emissions reduction policy cannot specify which 
technologies will be most effective in achieving this 
goal in the decades to come. It must be noted that 
only a few of the proponents of this option have distin-
guished themselves with ambitious climate policy 
efforts. Politically, this approach is aimed primarily 
against giving renewables a prominent place in EU 
energy policy. From this point of view, expanding the 
use of renewable energy is just one of many possible 
means of reducing emissions, alongside increasing the 
use of nuclear energy, switching from coal to gas in 
electricity production, increasing energy efficiency, 
and using carbon capture and storage (CCS) in fossil-
fuel-based power generation. If the EU should decide 
to take this path, it would allow individual Member 
States to forego significant increases in the use of 
renewables and thus to avoid radical restructuring of 
their energy systems. In any case, many Member States 
see a potential conflict here with EU primary law.29 
29  Article 194 (2) TFEU emphasizes the right of a Member 
State to “to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply.” In addition to 
this, without continuing the legal framework on renewable 
energy, the legal admissibility of maintaining national sup-
port schemes to promote the use of renewables could be 
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Design of the headline targets 
Using the argument that the most cost-effective 
method of emissions reduction would prevail within 
such a policy framework, the “technology-neutral” 
approach also serves the symbolic function of again 
bringing the aspect of competitiveness in EU energy 
and climate policy to the fore.30 
Option 2: Two binding targets: 
emissions reduction and renewable energy 
Up to now, only a few Member States have pushed 
for two new binding targets: one for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions and one for renewable 
energy.31 Proponents of this target architecture admit 
that the relationship between the two target catego-
ries would have to be clarified in order to better 
address negative interdependencies.32 To be sure, in 
confronting proponents of the “technology-neutral” 
approach (Option 1), they have been unable to con-
vincingly explain why expanding renewables should 
be subordinate to the objective of climate protection 
yet preferable to other energy sources. For this reason, 
proponents of a two-target architecture now tend to 
explain this approach more based on the relative in-
dependence of a specific renewables policy. In particu-
lar, they emphasize the advantages beyond emissions 
reductions that an expansion of renewable energy 
would have: increased supply security, safer energy 
called into question by the EU Competition Commissioner. 
The Commission’s proposal to reformulate state aid rules in 
the environmental and energy field already suggests the pos-
sibility of this, see European Commission, State aid: Commission 
consults on draft rules for state support in energy and environmental 
field, IP/13/1282 (Brussels, 18 December 2013). 
30  Correspondingly, this approach is favored by most of the 
industry associations. 
31  This group includes Belgium, France, Ireland, Germany, 
Austria, Portugal, and Denmark, although the last four are 
also in favor of adopting an energy efficiency target, that is, 
retaining the three targets currently in place (Option 3). Mem-
ber States that consider a renewable energy target to be pos-
sible or acceptable under some – not clearly defined – condi-
tions include Estonia, Finland, Italy, UK, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia. 
32  These Member States are referring to the debate on the 
current crisis of the ETS. Critics attribute the system’s over-
supply of emissions allowances to the rapid development of 
wind and solar energy, even though economic factors and 
allowances from international climate protection projects 
have probably had a significantly greater impact. 
production, higher domestic value added, decreased 
air pollution.33 
Option 3: Maintaining the current three targets 
Retaining the current target architecture would 
undoubtedly be the easiest approach to justify. How-
ever, the idea that the EU chose the best possible 
approach in 2007 and should maintain this compre-
hensive course of action largely unchanged in the 
future has lost currency over the past several years. 
So far, only four Member States have come out in 
favor of a three-target option: Denmark, Germany, 
Portugal, and Austria.34 An approach calling for re-
newed agreement on three headline targets does not, 
however, rely solely on the public appeal of proposing 
the most comprehensive approach possible. Parallel 
negotiations in three target sectors would also open 
up a wide range of possibilities for differentiated intra-
European burden-sharing. This in turn would increase 
the chances of overcoming impasses in the negotia-
tions and of accelerating the decision-making process 
among the 28 EU heads of state and government.35 
Design of the headline targets 
From a present-day perspective, it is highly probable 
that the negotiations on the basic target architecture 
will focus on options 1 and 2, and thus on the core 
question of whether or not there should be a binding 
renewable energy target. But this decision does not 
answer how the selected headline targets should be 
formulated in detail. This applies not only to the tar-
get levels but also to the question of target structures. 
New headline targets for emissions reduction, expan-
sion of renewable energy, or energy efficiency do not 
have to be constructed in the same way as their pre-
decessors from 2007. By freeing themselves of this lim-
itation, Member States would gain additional room to 
maneuver, which would likely facilitate compromise.36 
33  Proponents of a two-target architecture usually do not 
explain in detail why a separate energy efficiency target will 
not be needed in the future. 
34  This position finds support among the most important 
environmental non-governmental organizations. 
35  See Robert Koelemeijer et al., EU Policy Options for Climate 
and Energy beyond 2020 (The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environ-
mental Assessment Agency, 2013), 36f. 
36  The possibilities for variation presented in the following 
could already be included in the European Council’s decision 
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Emissions reduction target 
In the discussion on a European climate target for 
2030, the number 40 will likely be a central figure. 
The EU Commission first suggested a 40 percent reduc-
tion in European emissions as a milestone for the year 
2030 in its Low-Carbon Roadmap published in 2011. 
Thus, it comes as little surprise that the Commission 
proposed this target again in January 2014. Since the 
publication of the roadmap, a 40 percent reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions has been considered the 
minimum that would have to be achieved in the EU 
in order to reach the lower bound of emissions reduc-
tions envisioned by the European Council – and thus 
a litmus test for the credibility of EU climate policy.37 
For this reason, the 40 percent target carries great 
symbolic weight. The result is that Member States 
with higher climate policy ambitions that have al-
ready suggested a specific target for 2030 – including 
the UK, Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, 
and France – have all chosen 40 percent. Yet countries 
in the Visegrád Group that tend to resist ambitious EU 
climate policy efforts have avoided naming a target for 
2030 – even those that vigorously support the idea of 
a singular emissions reduction target. 
The question of what quantified target Europeans 
want to set their sights on for 2030 is directly linked 
to the still unresolved question of what relationship 
internal EU decisions should have to climate negotia-
tions on the UN level. There is likely to be general 
agreement among Member States that the EU needs 
to state what commitments it is willing to make in 
the coming UN framework well in advance of COP 21. 
What remains unresolved, however, is what concrete 
form this statement should take. On the one hand, the 
EU could agree on a unilateral reduction target for the 
period after 2020 that it would adhere to no matter 
what outcome the international negotiations produce. 
On the other hand, its decision on a reduction target 
could be conditional, that is, dependent on the success 
of the UN negotiations (however that success might be 
defined). Whereas the more ambitious Member States 
in climate policy lean toward agreeing on a unilateral 
target at an early stage in order to push UN negotia-
on the basic target architecture, e.g., in the form of an accom-
panying action plan. Some specific details could still be ad-
dressed during the subsequent legislative procedures, with 
the effect of remaining largely invisible to the broader public. 
37  See Brigitte Knopf et al., “Beyond 2020 – Strategies 
and costs for transforming the European energy system,” 
in Climate Change Economics 4 (2013) Suppl. 1. 
tions further and provide European businesses a cer-
tain degree of planning security, those countries that 
tend to block an ambitious EU climate policy, such as 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Romania, argue for strict conditionality.38 In their 
view, the EU should only commit to further emissions 
reductions if other major emitters agree to do the 
same. Whether such a scenario will play out, and what 
impact it would have on the EU, would become clear 
in 2016 at the earliest – and if the UN negotiation pro-
cess stalls, perhaps significantly later. If an intra-Euro-
pean compromise should emerge around an early uni-
lateral target combined with a conditional offer to 
the international community (as proposed by the UK), 
then the Visegrád Group would try to stop the EU 
from quantifying its conditional offer. This would pre-
vent a higher target from taking on a life of its own in 
the European climate debate even if the UN climate 
summit failed: This was what occurred after COP 15 in 
Copenhagen, when Poland came under great pressure 
to accept an increase in the EU emissions reduction 
target to 30 percent by 2020. 
It should be kept in mind that no matter what 
emissions reduction target the EU ultimately decides 
on, the figure itself will not a reliable indicator of 
the actual level of ambition in Europe. The EU Com-
mission’s Low-Carbon Roadmap and its proposal of 
January 2014 articulate a very ambitious interpreta-
tion of emissions reduction targets. Credits from inter-
national climate protection projects are not taken 
into account; emissions reductions must be achieved 
entirely within the EU. Correspondingly, the Commis-
sion’s proposed target for 2030 is “40 percent domes-
tic.” Up to now, all the Member States that are demand-
ing a 40 percent emissions reduction have embraced 
the more ambitious version,39 whereas the European 
Council is likely to prefer a weaker one, allowing the 
use of international credits. Yet as past experience 
38  Today, unlike in 2007, the use of a conditional target, 
whereby the EU promises to raise its own targets after a posi-
tive UN decision is reached, is no longer generally seen as a 
means of encouraging other developed countries and emerg-
ing economies to accept more ambitious targets in UN nego-
tiations. The main argument for a conditional target now is 
that an overly ambitious European leadership role in climate 
policy would place an undue burden on European industry 
and should therefore be avoided. 
39  According to the British concept, however, allowances 
from international climate projects could also be credited 
toward the EU’s reduction obligation at a rate of 5 to 10 per-
centage points under a (conditional) target of a 50 percent 
emissions reduction by 2030. 
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Design of the headline targets 
shows that this process will probably go largely un-
noticed by the broader public, a weakening of this 
target would not have negative effects on the EU’s 
climate policy communication.40 
Renewable energy target 
If a new target were also set for the expansion of 
renewable energy, it would not be as symbolically 
loaded as the emissions reduction target. Not only 
would it have no connection to the UN negotiation 
process; the share of renewables in the European 
energy mix – in contrast to emissions levels – is also 
not central to the idea of a transformation to a low-
carbon economy. In addition, there are no IPCC tar-
gets for 2050 in this field that could be interpreted in 
Europe as a guideline. All this leaves fairly substantial 
room for negotiation. 
Not all the Member States that are explicitly in 
favor of a binding renewable energy target have 
already proposed concrete figures. Many stick to the 
Commission’s January 2014 formula of “at least 27 
percent.” The fact that not even Denmark or Germany 
– which have called for a 30 percent share of renew-
ables by 2030 – go beyond the value stated in the Com-
mission’s Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that no major 
policy advances are likely in this area. The first prior-
ity of renewable energy proponents seems to be the 
fundamental governance question of whether an EU 
renewable energy target would be interpreted as an 
average, as it has been up to now, and then subse-
quently broken down into differentiated Member 
State targets, or whether the renewable targets should 
be defined for Europe as a whole – as proposed by the 
Commission in January 2014 – leaving it largely to 
40  A more flexible interpretation of the emissions reduction 
target would probably not be formulated explicitly in a Euro-
pean Council decision, but would only be introduced in the 
subsequent legislative procedures, e.g., in the revised ver-
sion of the Emissions Trading Directive or in the decision on 
national reduction targets for non-ETS sectors. Also the dis-
tribution of post-2020 reduction efforts between these two 
instruments would probably only be determined in the legis-
lative procedures. In any case, the higher the share of non-ETS 
sectors addressed by differentiated national targets, the more 
bargaining chips will be available for negotiation over a dis-
tribution of burdens among Member States. An additional 
means of subsequently making the emissions reduction tar-
get for 2030 less restrictive would be to not declare all excess 
emissions allowances from the phase up to 2020 invalid but 
to instead allow their use in the coming decade. 
market forces to determine where exactly in Europe 
these efforts will ultimately be carried out or only 
defining broad regional technology-specific capacity 
budgets.41 
It is rather unlikely that the European Council 
will adopt a new renewable energy target in the same 
form as the current one – that is, a target that is both 
legally binding and that applies to all energy con-
sumption sectors. On the one hand, this is due to the 
constellation of parties in the negotiations, which 
include a relatively large number of Member States 
that argue, under the banner of “technology neutrali-
ty,” for disposing with the renewable energy target 
altogether. On the other hand, it is due to the obvious 
problems of individual Member States in reaching 
their national renewables targets for 2020 and to 
the entire EU’s difficulties in increasing the share of 
renewables in the transport sector in an ecologically 
sustainable manner.42 
If those urging the expansion of renewable energy 
want the European Council to set a headline target in 
this area as well, they will have to win over the more 
skeptical Member States with a target formula involv-
ing only low additional obligations. There are two 
basic ways of doing this:43 The renewable energy pro-
ponents could (a) attempt to shoulder the burden of 
expanding renewable energy largely alone after 2020. 
Their own national targets would be raised again 
significantly, while the targets of the “technology-
neutral” Member States would be increased minimally 
at most. The overall EU target resulting from this would 
probably remain significantly below 30 percent. The 
renewable energy proponents could, however, (b) step 
back from addressing total energy consumption and 
focus instead on setting at least one prominent sec-
toral target for the expansion of renewables. The elec-
tricity sector would lend itself well to this given its 
central importance for the internal energy market, 
41  See Severin Fischer and Kirsten Westphal, Erneuerbare Ener-
gien im Stromsektor: Gestaltungsoptionen in der EU, SWP-Studie 
27/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 
2012), 31ff. 
42  See Severin Fischer and Sybille Röhrkasten, EU-Verkehrs-
sektor: Ende der Biokraftstoffpolitik, SWP-Aktuell 61/2013 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2013). 
43  The frequently chosen approach in the EU of softening 
legally binding targets by defining them as merely indicative 
would probably not be feasible in the case of a renewable 
energy target. The decision for a binding 20 percent renew-
ables target for 2020 was a reaction to the failure of previous-
ly existing indicative targets for the share of renewables in 
the electricity and in the transport sector. 
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Key elements of a negotiation compromise 
with the ongoing integration of national electricity 
markets and the high regulatory density of this sector. 
The share of renewables in the electricity sector is 
almost 10 percentage points higher than the average 
in total energy consumption (as of 2011: 21.7 versus 
13.0 percent). Since there is no separate electricity 
sector target for 2020, a target could be set for 2030 
that would appear relatively high (for example, 35 
percent) but that would only require a de facto mod-
erate increase in level of ambitions for Europe as a 
whole over the coming decade.44 
Efficiency target 
If the European Council does set another headline 
target in the area of energy efficiency, its aim will 
undoubtedly not be to achieve an absolute reduction 
in primary energy consumption. This approach, which 
was taken in 2007, is now perceived as “anti-growth” 
by some Member States, especially those with a com-
paratively low level of prosperity. In addition, the 
previously used indicator has been proven inaccurate 
since absolute energy consumption may decline in 
recession phases even if energy use does not become 
any more efficient. An obvious solution would be 
to switch to a relative efficiency target, based for in-
stance on the internationally established indicator 
energy intensity, which can be used to measure the 
relation between energy consumption and gross 
domestic product. What concrete level of improve-
ment the EU could achieve by 2030 has not been dis-
cussed at all in regard to this indicator. It is therefore 
unlikely that the European Council will set a new 
target for improving energy efficiency. And if the 
Council does make such a decision, it is fairly certain 
that its target will not be legally binding. 
Time horizon 
The debate over the EU’s new energy and climate 
targets has revolved up to now around a single date: 
2030. Not only the Green Paper but also the specific 
Commission proposals from January 2014 have used 
44  Even a weak target would reflect an emphasis on renew-
ables compared to conventional energy sources. This would 
help the proponents of renewable energy if a political dispute 
arose between Member States and the Commission over the 
internal market compatibility of national systems for pro-
moting the use of renewables. 
this as their target date. The Member States too have 
developed their positions around the year 2030. Yet a 
date of 2030 is by no means compulsory – the time 
horizon lies entirely at the discretion of the European 
Council. Furthermore, depending on the dynamics of 
the negotiations, it is conceivable that an initial agree-
ment could be reached on “post-2020 targets” only up 
to 2025. Raising this as an option would make particu-
lar sense for those Member States whose preferences 
leave them relatively isolated in the negotiations. The 
logic behind this is: the shorter the time horizon of 
the policy framework, the sooner a new round of nego-
tiations would take place. Arguments could be made 
that this would increase flexibility, which would be 
desirable in allowing the EU to respond better to eco-
nomic and political uncertainties. The evolution of EU 
energy and climate policy since 2007 shows that in 
this policy field – which already tends to polarize – it 
is virtually impossible to readjust previously decided 
headline targets, even if the surrounding conditions 
have changed fundamentally. The unanimity rule in 
the European Council is diametrically opposed to any 
such readjustments. 
Yet one could also imagine a scenario in which 
all those involved have an interest in a target date of 
2025. If Poland and its closest allies succeed in block-
ing substantial decisions prior to COP 21, and if the 
UN climate summit in 2015 does not produce any 
clear outcomes, causing international negotiations to 
drag on indefinitely, this will place substantial pres-
sure on the heads of state and government. This will 
be intensified by the need to provide a sound basis for 
investment planning – which will only be possible 
when the legislative procedures to design the instru-
ments have been concluded and the individual sectors 
and businesses can see what new regulations will be 
affecting them. The combination of a stalemate in the 
European Council and ongoing uncertainty about the 
further course of UN climate negotiations could make 
a limited time extension of the existing target archi-
tecture appear to be the only politically viable alter-
native. The heads of state and government would, in 
this scenario, set moderately increased new targets for 
emissions reduction, renewable energy, and efficiency 
for 2025 with the possible addition of a burden-shar-
ing component to address Poland’s demands. The 
fundamental decision about the future of European 
energy and climate policy would therefore be post-
poned temporarily. 
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Basic structure of the negotiation outcome 
As the discussion above has illustrated, a great deal 
still remains open in the process of coming to a deci-
sion on post-2020 targets. A concrete proposal of the 
Commission has only been available since January 
2014. This will affect the further debate but will in no 
way determine the decision. Many Member States have 
only taken positions on select issues up to now. More-
over, stable negotiation coalitions have not yet begun 
to form, with the exception of the Visegrád Group, 
which now also confers closely with Romania and 
Bulgaria (V4+2) over joint positions on questions of 
energy and climate policy. 
It is still too early to predict what specific outcomes 
the negotiations will have and how these will affect 
the structure of the EU’s energy supply. This is partly 
because – and this, at least, can already be predicted 
with some certainty – the policy model of a com-
prehensive transformation of the European energy 
system, carefully planned for decades to come, will 
reach its limits in the second implementation phase 
between 2021 and 2030. The closer we get to 2050 and 
the more ambitious the EU targets turn out to be, the 
more pressure Member State governments will be 
under to give the project of long-term economic trans-
formation top priority, despite whatever problems 
they might currently be facing. If the heads of state 
and government followed the same “master plan 
logic” that underlies not only the Commission’s road-
maps but also numerous macroeconomic studies on 
the future of the European energy system, then it 
would go without saying that domestic enterprises 
should be provided at least a basic level of investment 
and planning security. It would also be indisputable 
that decisions on the EU’s new target architecture 
and (unilateral) headline targets for 2030 should be 
reached significantly before 2015. Then, if the UN 
climate negotiations did yield an agreement, EU tar-
gets could be raised further. Yet such an enormous 
degree of comprehensive rationality cannot be found 
either in EU energy and climate policy or in any other 
policy field on the EU level. The expectation of con-
sistently rational behavior can only be maintained if 
one simultaneously ignores the dominant political 
and procedural rationalities operating within the EU. 
Up to this point, in order to present the most com-
prehensible analysis possible, we have followed the 
logic that has dominated the debate on the future of 
EU energy and climate policy so far. According to this 
logic, all the different targets and measures are inter-
connected; every step has to be seen within its broader 
overall context; isolated individual decisions should 
therefore be avoided. Only in the context of this kind 
of holistic interpretation does it make sense to think in 
terms of comprehensive target architectures. 
It may be, however, that a more sequential approach 
will gain traction – perhaps already in the post-2020 
negotiations. An explicit decision on a new target 
architecture might have to be postponed again and 
again while the heads of state and government are 
occupying themselves with urgent individual deci-
sions. It may be that the EU will not resolve its funda-
mental disagreement over the number and hierarchy 
of headline targets, even though it will have to agree 
on a climate target in the context of COP 21. Thus, 
despite all the mandates and proposals, the question 
of whether the EU will set new headline targets for 
renewable energy or energy efficiency may remain 
undecided for years to come. If this should occur, the 
issue of a complex post-2020 target architecture would 
remain on the policy agenda, but a single-target focus 
on emissions reduction (Option 1) would probably 
prevail.45 
What we are seeing here is the emergence of a pro-
cess-centered governance approach that could set the 
tone for EU energy and climate policy in the phase to 
come. The wide divergence of positions within the 
EU and the close linkage between European decision-
making processes and international climate negotia-
tions creates a degree of complexity that can no longer 
be practically managed using a “comprehensive” 
approach. This is likely to push the actors towards an 
increasingly pragmatic approach aimed at reaching 
the decisions that need to be made in individual 
policy areas but without doing so years ahead of time 
and without any precise schedules or action plans. In 
short: Energy and climate policy would gradually 
become “normalized.” 
 
 
45  In the environmental policy discourse, there is a strong 
tendency to constantly demand rapid improvements in tar-
gets, agreements, and instruments – with the implication 
that these improvements are really achievable in the near 
future (for example, based on new negotiation schedules or 
formalized review processes) – even if their chances of actual-
ly being adopted are low. Proponents of Options 2 and 3 are 
therefore likely to show an interest in postponing an explicit 
decision against renewable or efficiency targets for as long as 
possible. 
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 Paradigm change in Europe 
 
The decision-making process on the post-2020 EU 
policy framework is taking place under completely 
different premises than the one that ended in March 
2007 with the European Council’s decisions on the 
first phase of an integrated EU energy and climate 
policy. These new premises are evident, first, in the 
economic circumstances. The ongoing European debt 
and financial crisis has fundamentally changed the 
political priorities of many Member States. It has also 
been the top priority issue among European leaders 
for a number of years, while conflicts and difficulties 
in other policy areas have taken a back seat. In addi-
tion, a degree of disillusionment has set in. The hope 
often expressed in 2007 that energy and climate could 
become the positive themes defining the future of 
European integration dissipated rather quickly. In the 
UN climate negotiation process, almost no substantial 
progress has been made since 2008. Furthermore, 
global emissions are continually rising. Within the EU, 
the divisions have deepened further in recent years, 
especially between the climate policy laggards in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the climate policy 
proponents in Northern and Western Europe.46 
Without exception, all these actors are showing a 
heightened awareness that many developments in 
EU energy and climate policy are not taking place 
as desired, or at least not as predicted. On the one 
hand, there have been disappointments with Euro-
pean projects, instruments, and market developments 
– for example, the failure of the Nabucco gas pipeline, 
the crisis of the EU emissions trading scheme, and 
the emerging failure of the CCS strategy. On the other 
hand, there have been a series of positive develop-
ments in global energy markets that were not antici-
pated by EU energy policy – for example, the shale gas 
boom and the cost reductions in photovoltaics. Both 
have induced a degree of caution in European decision 
makers when it comes to setting legally binding tar-
46  The southern European Member States, which in 2007 
were still largely among the strong supporters of climate 
policy, have been significantly more cautious about climate 
policy questions since the onset of the economic and finan-
cial crisis. Yet with the exception of Cyprus, they have not yet 
joined the ranks of states attempting to stall any action on 
climate policy. 
gets 12 to 15 years in advance. Trust in the validity of 
macroeconomic scenarios and impact assessments has 
declined palpably, and faith in the accuracy of expert 
prognoses has also suffered. The complexities of the 
problems at hand – and the numerous contingencies47 
that cannot be resolved even with additional infor-
mation – have led the different groups of actors to 
operate increasingly within their own isolated real-
ities. As a result, it has become almost impossible for 
policy makers to agree on and then actually imple-
ment wide-ranging decisions on EU energy and cli-
mate policy. At present, this policy field is defined 
not by the often-invoked approach of evidence-based 
policy making, but rather by a mode of policy-based 
evidence making. Scientific studies have become vir-
tually incapable of influencing Member States to make 
informed changes in their positions. Instead, these 
studies serve primarily as means of legitimating 
already fixed policy positions. 
Sooner or later, the European Council will have to 
decide on its energy and climate headline targets for 
the post-2020 period. From a present-day perspective, 
not only is it likely that the outcome will be relatively 
modest, far below the level of ambitions stated in the 
Commission’s roadmaps; there is also much evidence 
to suggest that a more fundamental paradigm change 
is underway, not unlike the shifts that have taken 
place numerous times before in EU energy and cli-
mate policy.48 On trial here is not only the primacy of 
47  See, for a general overview, Horst Rittel and Melvin 
Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973): 155–69; Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Ambigu-
ity and Choice in European Public Policy,” Journal of European 
Public Policy 15, no. 4 (2008): 514–30; Friedbert W. Rüb, “Poli-
tisches Entscheiden. Ein prozess-analytischer Versuch,” in Plu-
ralismus – Strategien – Entscheidungen, ed. Nils C. Bandelow and 
Simon Hegelich (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaf-
ten, 2011), 17–45. 
48  See David Buchan, Why Europe’s Energy and Climate Policies 
Are Coming Apart, SP 28 (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, July 2013); Paradigms in Public Policy. Theory and Practice 
of Paradigm Shifts in the EU, ed. Marcus Carson, Tom Burns, and 
Dolores Calvo (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2009); Tim Rayner 
and Andrew Jordan, “The European Union: The Polycentric 
Climate Policy Leader?,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change 4, no. 2 (2013): 75–90. 
SWP Berlin 
Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives 
March 2014 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Fundamental shifts 
a sustainability-oriented approach but also the vision 
of an energy policy that is becoming progressively 
more coherent and more European in scope. If such 
a paradigm change takes place, what would be lost is 
nothing less than the program of energy system trans-
formation in its current form – not only the target 
of an 80 to 95 percent reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050, but also the underlying model of 
governance. 
Fundamental shifts 
Whereas sustainability was overtly prioritized in the 
EU energy strategy of 2007, its importance has been 
declining in recent years, even if this change has not 
always been immediately apparent. Given that all 
essential legislative procedures to implement the 
March 2007 European Council conclusions were con-
cluded in 2009, there has been little pressure to make 
new decisions since 2010. What has emerged as the 
main mode of conflict resolution between Member 
States is now intentional non-decision, whether in the 
debate on raising the EU climate target for 2020 or on 
a fundamental reform of emissions trading. This shift 
has been partially obscured by the communication 
policy of the EU Commission. Since the roadmaps pub-
lished over the course of 2011 were based primarily 
on the sustainability paradigm, and since no Member 
State with the exception of Poland had expressed open 
opposition, it still appeared that EU energy and cli-
mate policy was guided by the spirit of the 2007 reso-
lutions. Only with the European Council of May 2013, 
whose engagement with energy policy was confined 
to a discussion of energy price trends, did it finally 
become evident to the broader public that the issue of 
competitiveness had taken center stage in EU energy 
and climate policy. The issue of electricity and gas 
price trends, especially relative to the USA, is one of 
the few topics that is high on the energy policy agenda 
of all of the Member States and one that is capable of 
mobilizing broader coalitions than is usually the case 
in this rather polarized policy field. 
The second fundamental shift in European energy 
and climate policy can be seen in the relation of the 
Member States to the EU. The energy sector has un-
deniably become more Europeanized in the last sev-
eral years, in part as a result of the Third Internal 
Energy Market Package. The increased European inte-
gration has been limited, however, to electricity and 
gas markets, whereas an integration of Member States’ 
energy policies has failed for the most part to material-
ize. To this day, Member States insist on their sover-
eign right, guaranteed under Article 194 TFEU, to 
decide on their own national energy mix. Most Mem-
ber States oppose European initiatives that could lead 
to undesired changes in national energy supply struc-
tures: they want first and foremost to define and pur-
sue their own priorities. Where these stand in direct 
contradiction to the mainstream of European energy 
and climate policy, the Member States generally tend 
to play for time. During the last few years, many Mem-
ber States have been attempting to prevent (harmoni-
zation of energy taxation), stall (emissions trading 
reform), and weaken (CO2 emissions standards for pas-
senger cars) undesired European regulatory initiatives. 
This practice can also be found in other fields of EU 
policy – it is certainly not unique to EU energy and cli-
mate policy per se. Yet if one considers the project of 
energy system transformation, a fundamental contra-
diction becomes apparent. If the EU is indeed to 
become a low-carbon economy by the year 2050, emitting 
80 to 95 percent less greenhouse gases than in 1990, 
this will demand a continually increasing convergence 
of national energy policies, which in turn will progres-
sively limit the Member States’ sovereign powers. It is 
illusory to expect that such ambitious EU targets can 
be achieved through simple addition of 28 national 
energy policies. Since this contradiction is directly 
related to questions of the distribution of competenc-
es in EU primary law, the Member States and the Com-
mission have decided to maintain the illusion for the 
time being. 
Scientific vs. political justifications for 
low-carbon transformation 
The two emerging trends sketched out above – a shift 
in priorities from ecological sustainability to competi-
tiveness and a tendency to avoid European policies 
that could impinge on national sovereignty – do not 
give reason to expect that the project of a complete 
low-carbon transformation of European economies 
(and thus also of the energy system) by 2050 will be 
pursued seriously.49 Up to now, it has largely escaped 
notice that even the European Council’s long-term 
49  Even under these premises, it is not entirely impossible 
that the energy system transformation will take place by 
2050 – but this will only happen if rapid technological pro-
gress is capable of compensating for the lack of political will. 
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target contains two conditional provisions that were 
pushed through by Poland. In its decision, the Euro-
pean Council stated that it supports the EU’s goal “in 
the context of necessary reductions according to the 
IPCC by developed countries as a group, to reduce 
emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 compared to 1990 
levels.”50 This decision is now generally understood 
in the sense of a conditional target that would only 
become politically binding for Europeans if the “group 
of developed countries” really does act as a group, that 
is, if all of the developed countries51 agree to a corre-
sponding level of ambitions. This is already question-
able, and the likely failure to fulfill this condition at 
the 2015 UN Climate Summit in Paris will strongly 
influence internal EU negotiations over post-2020 
targets. In addition, the fact that the European Coun-
cil’s 2009 target formula relates specifically to the 
third part of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report 
from 2007 has been completely ignored in the politi-
cal debate. Thus, each new IPCC Assessment Report 
could also necessitate – or at least legitimize – a new 
decision by the European Council. The target formu-
lated by the European Council in 2009 offers two pos-
sible points of departure for such a decision. 
Because of the constantly increasing per capita 
emissions in most of the so-called “developing coun-
tries,” which in many cases already exceed the levels 
of some EU Member States, it is conceivable that 
future IPCC reports52 will do away with the somewhat 
anachronistic dichotomy of the world into developed 
and developing countries.53 It is possible that the IPCC 
itself will no longer assign all 28 EU Member States to 
50  Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 
29/30 October 2009. Presidency Conclusions, doc. 15265/1/09 REV 1, 
3. In February 2011, the European Council reaffirmed this 
decision in slightly different words. 
51  The corresponding passage in the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC refers specifically to the “Annex I Parties” 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992. 
These consist essentially of the then-members of the OECD 
and the Eastern bloc countries. In the UN climate policy con-
text, developing countries and emerging economies are sub-
sumed under the term “Non-Annex I Parties,” see Sujata 
Gupta et al., “Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrange-
ments,” in Climate Change 2007: Mitigation – Contribution of Work-
ing Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, ed. Bert 
Metz et al. (Cambridge/New York: IPCC, 2007), 776. 
52  The contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the IPCC (Mitigation of Climate Change) will be 
published in April 2014. 
53  This division – because of its embedding in the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change – is nevertheless likely 
to remain influential in international climate policy. 
the same group but rather introduce a further distinc-
tion between the “old” developed countries and the 
post-socialist countries – which would probably fur-
ther complicate the intra-European negotiation pro-
cess.54 Yet even if the IPCC were to maintain the 
traditional distinction in international climate policy 
between “developed” and “developing” countries, it 
is highly improbable that progress in climate science 
will leave a reduction target of 80 to 95 percent for 
2050 in place – as formulated in 2007 for the tradi-
tional industrialized countries – for decades to come.55 
In the course of negotiations over the post-2020 
targets for European energy and climate policy, the EU 
– and as a result also the German government – will 
doubtless no longer be able to avoid providing politi-
cal justification for their emissions reduction targets. 
The heads of state and government will have to an-
swer a question they have strenuously avoided up to 
now: What does it mean that the sluggish UN process 
has been unable to provide any convincing argument 
for drastic emissions reductions in Europe? Does the 
EU want to simply give up on the project of a low-
carbon economy? If not, what climate policies should 
be used to manage its implementation? Should the 
target for 2050 be maintained, while imposing signifi-
cant carbon taxes on imports from countries without 
ambitious climate policies? Should the targets-and-time-
tables approach be modified by making the existing 
emissions reduction paths less ambitious? Or should 
the EU restrict itself to saying that the decarboniza-
tion of European economies is its ultimate goal and 
one the Member States should work toward continu-
ously – but without stating what progress has to be 
achieved well in advance of 2030 or 2050?56 
54  More recent approaches from mitigation research assume 
the existence of five to ten regional groups on the global level 
whose emissions reduction potentials can be evaluated in a 
differentiated fashion. Western Europe is usually counted as 
part of the top group “OECD1990” and the Central and East-
ern European countries among the “Economies in Transition” 
(EIT); see Niklas Höhne, Michel den Elzen, and Donovan 
Escalante, “Regional GHG Reduction Targets Based on Effort 
Sharing: A Comparison of Studies,” Climate Policy 14, no. 1 
(2014): 122–47. 
55  Depending on the assumptions made, this could result 
either in raising the reduction targets considered necessary 
for the developed countries or in lowering these targets. 
56  See Oliver Geden, “The End of Climate Policy as We Knew 
it,” in Expect the Unexpected, ed. Volker Perthes and Barbara 
Lippert, SWP Research Paper 1/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, January 2012), 19–22. 
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Scientific vs. political justifications for low-carbon transformation 
Experiences with European energy and climate 
policy since 2007 show that in contrast to what 
environmentalists, think-tanks, energy companies, 
policy makers, and macroeconomic modelers are 
calling for or even assuming, the EU does not con-
sistently make decisions or pass measures that cor-
respond to its own political program of low-carbon 
energy system transformation. It goes without saying 
that the call for a coherent policy framework is per-
fectly legitimate. However, one cannot seriously 
assume that such a policy framework will be put into 
practice. Moreover, to base expectations for future 
political practice on the, empirically speaking, shaky 
assumption of a policy design based on comprehensive 
rationality is not only questionable from an analytical 
standpoint; it also completely misses the mark in terms 
of providing useful policy advice and orientation. 
Inconsistencies between policy discourse, decisions, 
and implementation are a defining feature of everyday 
political life: they allow governments to address the 
widely disparate and conflicting concerns of diverse 
stakeholder groups and constituencies.57 This may 
help to explain why a rigid transformation concept 
that is based on the assumption of consistent political 
action over the course of four decades is extraordinari-
ly susceptible to failure. The realization that the EU 
energy and climate policy negotiations run the risk of 
ending in a stalemate over the post-2020 policy frame-
work should therefore provide an impetus to consider 
new models of governance for an energy and climate 
policy with a long-term orientation – a third way 
between targets and timetables and muddling through. 
This is imperative not only for the EU, but also for Ger-
many, whose long-term energy transition project aims 
at achieving a similar level of decarbonization (80 to 
95 percent by 2050) with a more limited set of tech-
nological options. 
 
 
57  See Nils Brunsson, The Consequences of Decision-Making 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); idem, The Organization 
of Hypocrisy. Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations (Copen-
hagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2006). 
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 Effects on Germany’s “Energiewende” policy 
 
The course and outcomes of the negotiations over the 
future of EU energy and climate policy in Brussels 
will also affect Germany’s energy transition (“Energie-
wende”) policy. First, the German government will 
have to develop a negotiation strategy that promises 
success on the EU level but that can also be presented 
convincingly to the German public. Second, it will 
have to deal with the contradictions that are likely to 
arise between the EU and the German policy frame-
work. The more the EU slows down the pace of trans-
formation, and assuming that German ambitions 
remain high in the core energy transition areas – 
phasing out nuclear power, reducing greenhouse 
gases, and expanding renewable energy,58 the greater 
these contradictions will be. At present, it appears 
highly likely that the 28 heads of state and govern-
ment of the EU Member States will set only a moder-
ate emissions reduction target and will not agree on 
a new renewables target for the entire energy sector – 
regardless of the EU Commission’s proposals present-
ed in January 2014 for EU energy and climate policy 
up to 2030. Such a decision by the European Council 
would create pressure to modify some German “Energie-
wende” targets. If the key players in German energy and 
climate policy want to confront this challenge effec-
tively, it will not suffice for them to campaign more 
vigorously on the EU level. In order to achieve success 
in the EU arena, the German government will first 
58  The “Energiewende” decisions of 2011 contained numer-
ous quantified individual targets, but did not create any 
explicit hierarchy among them. A systematization proposed 
by the expert commission that was formed to monitor the 
energy transition names two headline targets: reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions (40 percent by 2020, 80–95 percent 
by 2050) and phasing out nuclear power by 2022 (see Exper-
tenkommission zum Monitoring-Prozess “Energie der Zu-
kunft,” Stellungnahme zum ersten Monitoring-Bericht der Bundes-
regierung für das Berichtsjahr 2011 [Berlin et al., December 2012], 
5ff). If one analyzes the German energy transition discourse 
in detail, it becomes evident that expanding the use of energy 
from renewable sources (with a focus on the electricity sec-
tor) must be considered one of the core areas of the German 
“Energiewende”. The range stated in the coalition agreement 
between CDU, CSU, and SPD for renewables in the electricity 
sector (40–45 percent in 2025, 55–60 percent in 2035) hardly 
diverge from the plan for expanding the use of renewable 
energies set out in the original energy concept. 
have to clarify which of the possible strategies for design-
ing the European dimension of Germany’s “Energiewende” 
policy it wants to pursue in the future. Recommenda-
tions for how the German government should proceed 
in the framework of the post-2020 negotiations can 
only be formulated consistently in relation to the indi-
vidual strategic options.59 
A glance at recent history shows that German 
energy and climate policy – contrary to all the pro-
European rhetoric since the 2011 decision to phase 
out nuclear power – has actually undergone an in-
ward turn. This is hardly surprising given the scale 
of the tasks at hand and the controversy surrounding 
numerous details of the national energy transition. In 
functional terms, the imminent reform of the German 
electricity market should be approached from a Euro-
pean perspective by involving at least the neighboring 
states and the EU Commission in this process. Yet 
negotiations over these reforms, which are already 
complicated in the German multi-level system, would 
become even more complex if other European actors 
were brought in. This would make the process signifi-
cantly more difficult for the German government to 
manage, both in terms of the content of the reform 
and the process of communication. 
The strategy of largely ignoring the European 
dimension of the “Energiewende” is not just prag-
matic. It is also based on the German self-perception 
of being a leader in energy and climate policy, whose 
good example the other Europeans will eventually 
follow – either by making ambitious decisions on the 
EU level or by imitating at some later point in time. 
Past German administrations were able to employ this 
notion with almost no political risk. They occasionally 
had to fend off accusations that Germany is too ambi-
tious in its environmental policy compared to other 
Europeans and that its go-it-alone path in energy 
policy is too costly, thus endangering the competitive-
ness of German industry. Yet these debates have had 
a limited effect so far and have not led, at the current 
59  See Ralf Tils, Politische Strategieanalyse. Konzeptionelle Grund-
lagen und Anwendung in der Umwelt- und Nachhaltigkeitspolitik 
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005); 
Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils, Politische Strategie. Eine Grund-
legung (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007). 
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level of ambitions, to widespread questioning of Ger-
many’s leadership role. Furthermore, consensus 
remains broad in Germany on phasing out nuclear 
power, reducing emissions, and expanding the use of 
renewable energy.60 Although changes have begun 
to occur on the EU level – largely unnoticed by the 
German public – they will affect Germany’s ability 
to play a successful leadership role within the EU. 
The most prominent example of such a change is 
certainly the EU Commission’s state aid investigation 
into some features of the German Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG), which could endanger the existence 
of the support system of the EU’s largest Member State 
in the long run.61 This would not only have a negative 
effect on national plans for the expansion of renewa-
bles; it would also raise the importance of a decision 
in favor of a new target for renewable energy in the 
context of the EU post-2020 negotiations. In climate 
policy, Germany is now heavily dependent on develop-
ments in Europe as a whole. If regulatory systems are 
conceptualized transnationally, as has been the case 
with EU emissions trading since 2013, then a low level 
of ambition for Europe as a whole will have a direct 
effect on the feasibility of a higher German level of 
ambition.62 In the worst case, this would make it con-
siderably more difficult for Germany to achieve its 
own climate targets. 
Pressure to modify “Energiewende” targets 
At present, it appears plausible that the EU target 
architecture will be reduced to a single emissions 
reduction target after 2020 with a low level of am-
bition – even below the “40 percent domestic” level 
60  See Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft, 
BDEW-Energiemonitor 2014: Das Meinungsbild der Bevölkerung. 
Kommentierte Zusammenfassung (Berlin: BDEW, February 2014). 
61  Although Competition Commissioner Almunia only ques-
tioned Germany’s exemptions for energy-intensive industries 
and the “green electricity privilege” (provided for in the EEG 
Act), this could lead to an overall assessment of the German 
renewables support system under the new guidelines on en-
vironmental and energy state aid for 2014-2020, see European 
Commission, State aid: Commission opens in-depth inquiry into sup-
port for energy-intensive companies benefitting from a reduced renew-
ables surcharge, IP/13/1283 (Brussels, 18 December 2013); idem, 
State aid: draft rules (see note 29). 
62  Oliver Geden, Klimaziele im Mehrebenensystem. Konfliktpoten-
tiale bei der Implementierung der “Kyoto-II”-Verpflichtungen in EU-
Recht, SWP-Arbeitspapier FG1, 2013/04 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, August 2013). 
proposed by the Commission. If this happens, Ger-
many’s key “Energiewende” targets will be affected in 
very different ways. While such a decision on a Euro-
pean target would have no negative consequences for 
the German roadmap to phase out the use of nuclear 
energy, it might impede Germany’s expanded use 
of renewable energy. And it is highly likely to have a 
negative impact on emissions reduction policies. 
Even if Europe does not set a new renewable energy 
target in the same form as the current one, Germany 
could still set its own target of achieving 30 percent 
renewable energy in total energy consumption by 
2030 (as of 2011: 12.1 percent). However, if this were 
perceived by the German public as “going it alone” 
within Europe, the project of ambitious energy system 
transformation would meet with substantially in-
creased political opposition. Furthermore, public dis-
cussion of the overall costs is likely to flare up again 
and again in the years to come. Such discussions 
might be sparked by European issues, such as the fact 
that the Benelux countries and France, which have 
close ties to the German electricity market, profit from 
the significant decline in electricity wholesale prices 
across the entire market area thanks to the wind 
and photovoltaic installations subsidized by German 
energy consumers. The effort required to maintain 
network security will probably increase significantly 
if neighboring countries like Poland and the Czech 
Republic, which have decided against an energy 
strategy based on renewables, design their electricity 
networks in such a way that they are able to block the 
transit from northern to southern Germany during 
high-wind periods. The expansion of electricity net-
works within Germany, which has barely begun, will 
probably encounter major acceptance problems in 
many regions. And not least of all, a significant in-
crease in the share of renewables in energy consump-
tion sectors like heat and transport, which up to now 
have been relatively unaffected by reforms, will put 
the German population’s willingness to play a leader-
ship role to the test. In all these cases, the argument 
could be made that Germany would be better off 
partially adjusting to a European approach and 
slowing down the domestic expansion of renewable 
energies. Against this backdrop, it seems sensible to 
encourage efforts to further expand the use of renew-
able energy in the electricity sector, both within 
Germany and also within the EU. This would not only 
be in the interest of German industrial policy, but 
could also make it easier to carry out necessary dis-
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cussions with neighboring countries about the design 
of a cross-border electricity market. 
What is much more vulnerable to negative Euro-
pean influences is Germany’s emissions reduction 
policy. In the scenario assumed here, there would still 
be a basic consensus between Germany and the EU on 
the role of targets, but the significantly differing levels 
of ambition would pose a problem. No one can prevent 
Germany from maintaining its national emissions 
reduction target of 55 percent by 2030 (as of 2012: 24.7 
percent). Yet it is difficult to predict whether Germany 
would face pressure to adjust its 2030 objectives simp-
ly because its own emissions reduction target turns 
out to be far more ambitious than the EU target even 
at the end of the next decade. It is also impossible to 
say with any certainty whether the measures needed 
to achieve the 55 percent target will come under 
criticism if significant progress is not made in inter-
national climate negotiations.63 
Far more critical than the potential problem of 
increasing doubts about Germany’s future climate 
policy leadership role is the issue of the deteriorating 
conditions that such a role would require. A relatively 
unambitious EU climate target would have a negative 
impact on the ETS allowance price and would thus 
exacerbate an already very strong tendency. Since 
barely half of German greenhouse gas emissions are 
regulated directly through EU emissions trading, the 
persistently low allowance price has made it signifi-
cantly more difficult for Germany to maintain its 
original targeted emissions reduction path, which was 
calculated on the basis of much higher CO2 prices. As a 
consequence, the CO2-intensive energy sources lignite 
and hard coal profit in particular from price erosion 
in the ETS and place a growing burden on Germany’s 
overall emissions balance. Germany will only be able 
to achieve a direct and short-term increase in allow-
ance prices through initiatives at the EU level – 
whether by raising the European climate target for 
2020 or by reforming emissions trading. In the chosen 
post-2020 scenario, however, such initiatives would 
have relatively little chance of success. The German 
government would be left with only one option to 
meet its own emissions reduction goals: the use of 
additional national measures. First, it would have 
to introduce further regulatory instruments for the 
63  Germany’s target formulae for medium- to long-term 
emissions reductions, in contrast to the EU’s, do not contain 
any conditional elements that would require similar efforts 
by other developed countries and emerging economies. 
energy sector, such as technical emissions perfor-
mance standards for power plants or a minimum 
price for fossil fuels for installations covered by the 
ETS (carbon floor price).64 Second, it would finally 
be forced to take additional emissions reduction 
measures in the sectors of transport, agriculture, and 
buildings, which until now have been largely spared 
from widely unpopular regulations.65 
Strategies for designing the European dimen-
sion of Germany’s “Energiewende” policy 
It is beyond dispute that Germany’s energy transition 
has a profoundly European dimension, given the 
strong regulatory framework established by the EU 
and the increasingly close ties with neighboring coun-
tries’ electricity and gas markets. Yet there has not been 
much reflection on the implications of this situation 
in the German energy policy discussion to date.66 The 
EU level is usually only brought into this discussion 
selectively – in some cases to argue for accelerating 
the energy transition, in others to argue for slowing it 
down. 
There are essentially three possible ideal-type strat-
egies for designing the European dimension of Ger-
many’s “Energiewende” policy that differ not only in 
their principal direction but also in their respective 
chances of realization: establishing a European “Energie-
wende,” adjusting the German course, or minimizing EU 
interference. Depending on which direction the German 
government wants to take in the future, different 
approaches for the post-2020 negotiations emerge.67 
64  Such measures could improve the German emission bal-
ance, but this would not lead to a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions from an overall European perspective since the 
emissions allowances saved in Germany would be used in 
other EU countries, see Stefano Clò, Susan Battles, and Pietro 
Zoppoli, “Policy Options to Improve the Effectiveness of the 
EU Emissions Trading System: A Multi-criteria Analysis,” 
Energy Policy 57 (2013): 477–90. 
65  See Oliver Geden, Die Implementierung der “Kyoto-II”-Ver-
pflichtungen in EU-Recht. Enger werdende Spielräume für eine klima-
politische Vorreiterrolle Deutschlands, SWP-Aktuell 69/2013 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2013). 
66  See Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden, Europeanising the 
German Energy Transition, SWP Comments 33/2011 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2011); Oliver 
Geden and Severin Fischer, “Die ‘Energiewende’ wird euro-
päisch,” Berliner Republik 1 (2014): 11–13. 
67  These would have to be expanded in the years to come to 
include political initiatives on the EU level, which, however, 
cannot be explored in detail in this study. 
SWP Berlin 
Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives 
March 2014 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
Strategies for designing the European dimension of Germany’s “Energiewende” policy 
Establishing a European “Energiewende” 
The aim of bringing the entire EU onto a single policy 
path that corresponds to the basic tenets of the German 
energy transition is undoubtedly the most demanding 
of the strategies sketched out here. A transformation 
project that is to achieve a unilateral 80 to 95 percent 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 mainly 
through increased use of renewable energy, improved 
energy efficiency, and without the use of nuclear 
power will probably not be capable of gaining major-
ity support – leaving aside Denmark, Austria, and 
other smaller Member States. However, explicit agree-
ment on a European phase-out of nuclear energy 
would not even be necessary in the framework of the 
post-2020 negotiations. In view of the extremely diffi-
cult market environment for the construction of new 
nuclear power plants, which in any case would cur-
rently be impossible without substantial subsidies, it 
would be enough not to significantly improve the 
framework conditions for nuclear energy.68 Thus, in 
the post-2020 negotiations, Germany would have to 
work to prevent a decision in favor of just a single 
“technology-neutral” climate objective and urge that 
the three targets agreed on in 2007 be maintained. In 
addition, it would have to ensure that a European 
Council decision is made as soon as possible and that 
it contains ambitious targets for emissions reductions, 
expansion of renewable energy, and the increase of 
energy efficiency. However, this carries the risk that 
Germany would be perceived in European negotiations 
as inflexible and unwilling to compromise, which 
could cause the positions of other Member States, not 
least of all the Visegrád Group, to become more en-
trenched. This would result in an increased risk that 
the final decision by the European Council will be 
postponed indefinitely. 
Adjusting the German course 
From a diametrically opposed perspective, processes at 
the EU level could be used to justify corrections of the 
German energy transition course. Theoretically, this 
68  Germany would have to give its explicit support for the 
in-depth investigation initiated by the Commission into the 
British use of a feed-in tariff to subsidize the construction of 
a new nuclear power plant (Hinkley Point C). It would also be in 
the German interest if the Commission decided to include 
restrictions for nuclear power in its new state aid guidelines 
for environment and energy. 
approach could be used as a way to deliberately curb 
the pace of transformation in Germany, for instance, 
by playing a more passive role in post-2020 negotia-
tions or intentionally escalating conflicts with the 
Commission over the state aid procedures. A much 
more realistic variant of this approach, however, 
would be for Germany to forgo an active leadership 
role in negotiations and not make any effort to pre-
vent the aforementioned developments on the EU 
level. After all, if the German government were to 
accept a weak compromise, this acquiescence could be 
used to relativize Germany’s probable failure to meet 
some “Energiewende” targets and to call the need for 
German leadership in climate protection into ques-
tion. If the post-2020 negotiations in the EU result, for 
instance, in agreement on a relatively unambitious 
emissions reduction target, the functioning of the 
ETS will make it impossible to meet the climate tar-
gets contained in the German “Energiewende” policy. 
Responsibility for this failure would be directed at 
the EU Member States that tend to slow down any EU 
action on climate policy – especially the Visegrád 
countries led by Poland. 
Minimizing EU interference 
In light of the complex constellation of interests in EU 
negotiations, the paradigm shift underway in energy 
and climate policy, and the continued broad consen-
sus on the transformation of the German energy sys-
tem, a relatively pragmatic strategy appears to be the 
most advisable. This approach would center on the 
attempt to design EU policies that ideally reinforce 
and support, but at least do not interfere with the 
German “Energiewende” in order to prevent EU devel-
opments from undermining this flagship project as 
much as possible. In the EU post-2020 negotiations, 
the German government would have to concentrate 
on reaching agreement on a comprehensive package 
that contains both an ambitious emissions reduction 
target and a legally binding target for renewable 
energy. To achieve this, Germany would have to be 
willing, in the case of conflict, to slow down or even 
block European negotiations. If the need for further 
national emissions reduction efforts is to be mini-
mized, the new EU emissions target would have to be 
formulated in such a way that it directly affects allow-
ance prices in the ETS, for example, by strictly limiting 
emissions allowances from international climate pro-
tection projects. With regard to the renewable energy 
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target, it will probably be very difficult to reach an 
agreement in the European Council that covers all 
energy consumption sectors. From a German point of 
view, this is not strictly necessary, since the transport 
and heating sectors are only marginally relevant to 
the common European energy market and only play a 
minor role in the German “Energiewende” discourse. 
A European energy policy supporting the German 
energy transition would have to strongly promote the 
use of renewables in the electricity sector across the 
EU. Germany will only be able to achieve its national 
deployment path efficiently through integration into 
the European electricity network and in conformity 
with European state aid rules. The German govern-
ment will therefore have to campaign vigorously for 
a renewable energy target in the electricity sector. 
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